

Lebanon: A Country of Emigration and Immigration

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Migration Patterns: Lebanon

The first section of this paper aims to give a concise account of the patterns, history, and characteristics of Lebanese Migration from 1870 to the present day.

Before describing the patterns of migration to and from Lebanon, it is critical to lay out the geographical boundaries of the area which constitutes this paper's focus. Mount Lebanon refers to a primary source of early emigration that existed between 1870 and 1920. Present day Lebanon, which was founded in 1920 and became independent in 1943, is dealt with later in the paper.

Lebanese emigration started in Mount Lebanon, which included the major coastal cities of Jounieh and Byblos – but not Beirut. To the north, Mount Lebanon included neither Tripoli nor Akkar. The Beqaa Valley and South Lebanon (including Sidon and Tyre) were also excluded. Mount Lebanon became an autonomous administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire in 1860, and was governed by a Christian Ottoman Pasha appointed by the Supreme Port and selected from outside Mount Lebanon (now called the *Mutasarrifiya*).

Waves of Lebanese Migration

This section discusses patterns and characteristics of Lebanese emigration from the Ottoman Empire until 2007.

Emigration from Lebanon: the first wave

Throughout modern history, Lebanon has experienced waves of emigration. For more than a century and a half Lebanon has sent inhabitants abroad to seek better fortunes. This is largely the result of a combination of lopsided economic development and undemocratic communal politics. In addition, Lebanon's geographic location, in a region ridden with national and international conflicts, has contributed to emigration throughout history. The disintegration of the *Muqata`aji* system (a specific form of centralized feudalism) in Mount Lebanon between 1840 and 1860, and the increasing integration of the mountain economy into the expanding British and French capitalist market were two important factors that ushered in the emigration that continues today.

A small number of people emigrated from Mount Lebanon prior to the 1870s. They were mostly Christians who were sent by the Maronite Catholic Church to study in Rome in order to return and serve as the clergy. In addition, a small number of Christians emigrated to "Egypt and the main centres (*si*) of trade between Europe and the Near East – Livorno, Marseille, Manchester" as a result of mercantile capitalist developments in Europe and religious links (Hourani, in Hourani and Shehadi, Eds. 1992: 5). These movements formed the first wave of emigration from Mount Lebanon.

Emigration from Lebanon: The Second Wave

A second wave of emigration came as a result of the emancipation of the peasants in 1860 and the integration of the local economy into the European capitalist market. This phase was characterized by major growth in the population. Most reliable figures place the annual rate of growth between 0.7 and 0.8 percent between 1840 and 1895 (Issawi, 1992: 22-23). Between 1783 and 1860, the population grew from 120,000 to about 200,000, and it was 280,000 two decades later. By 1913 the number was 414,800 (Khater, 2001:59).

This population increase was accompanied by “a growing number of educated men, and a smaller number of women, who looked for opportunity to use their newly acquired skills” (Tabar, 2009b: 3). The spread of Catholic and Protestant missionary schools increased education levels in Lebanon (Issawi, 1992: 4). What is remarkable here is that this was possible due to social and economic capital transfer resulting from first and second wave migration from Lebanon. Churchmen who had left for Rome returned with knowledge acquired in Europe, and played a key role in building schools and educating the population, alongside nuns and other foreign missionaries.¹ Furthermore, remittances and capital introduced by migrants who returned to Lebanon were in part put towards the education of the migrants' children, and consequently led to an improvement of their skills and opportunity for work.²

Economic prosperity, driven by the development of the silk industry (Issawi, in Hourani and Shehadi, Eds. 1992: 22-27) and relative political stability following the civil strife of 1860, created the environment for local populations to find work and raise their standard of living. However, by the late nineteenth century the collapse of the silk industry forced many Lebanese people to seek better economic opportunities abroad. Due to structural weakness, the silk industry could not withstand competition from Japan and China, and later, the introduction of artificial fabrics. In addition, many historians argue that the increasing urbanization of Mount Lebanon, the emergence of a middle class, and the fear of conscription into the Ottoman army led many Christians to emigrate (Issawi, in Hourani and Shehadi, Eds. 1992: 27-30). Commenting on the post-1860 generation of peasants, Khater states:

Having grown in relative prosperity, these peasants were facing limitations that threatened to send them economically a few steps backward. At the end of the 1880s silk was no longer the golden crop it had been ten or twenty years before. At the same time, rising land prices and shrinking inheritance combined to make the economic future bleak. So it was that many peasants arrived at the year 1887 with a sense of malaise. They did not have much land, and what little they had did not promise to make them a “good” living...Although some villagers did migrate seasonally to neighboring cities (like Aleppo and Bursa), these areas provided limited opportunities as they were experiencing their own economic crises. ...These drawbacks made a number of peasants look for other ways out of their dilemma—namely, how to make enough money quickly to guarantee their status as landowners and not slip back into the ranks of the landless laborers. About the only option that appeared on the economic horizons was emigration (2001: 60-61).

By World War I, a third of the population of Mount Lebanon had left. Most were Christian, and ended up in North and South America. In numerous reports of early migrations, migrants from Ottoman Syria left to go to a place called “*Amrika*” (i.e. America, slang used by Lebanese peasants) yet found themselves in Canada, South America, Australia, West Africa, Europe, New Zealand when they were not allowed in the US, or because of conniving mismanagement from migration and shipping agent (Issawi, 1992). According to Labaki and Abu Rjaili, the number of people who left Mount Lebanon per year between

¹ For more details on this point see: Harik, I. (1968) *Politics and change in a traditional society; Lebanon, 1711-1845*, Princeton University Press

² Sybille Stamm, (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich), “Social Networks Among Migrants to Post-War Lebanon,” Center for Comparative and International Studies, No. 9, 2006, pp. 21.

1860 and 1900 averaged 3,000, with a sharp rise to 15,000 per year between 1900 and 1914³ (2005: 59).

At this point, it is important to explore the impact that pre-World War I Lebanese emigration had on the political and economic development of the country. In addition to the money coming in from remittances, and its significance on the local economy, it is estimated that a third of the migrants returned to Lebanon (Khater, 2001). These return migrants greatly contributed to the formation of a middle class, which played a major role in the development of the tertiary sector (i.e. tourism, trading, and construction) and the building of the modern Lebanese state. As they returned, they brought with them the necessary economic and cultural capital used to spread middle class culture. A very dynamic – and mostly Christian – middle class was created, which became the driving force behind the creation of modern Lebanon in 1920 (Khater, 2001).

Emigration from Lebanon Post-WWII: The Third Wave

Due to the severe depression that hit the world economy in 1929, Lebanese emigration decreased. However, it resumed after 1945, increased considerably in the 1960s, and picked up even more after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967.⁴ The period starting in 1945 and ending in April 1975 constituted a third wave of emigration from Lebanon.

Between 1945 and 1960, the number of emigrants averaged 3,000 annually (Labaki, 1992: 605). 8,000 people left Lebanon between 1960 and 1970, increasing to 10,000 between 1970 and 1975 (Labaki, 2005: 59). The demand for labor in the Gulf States, whose revenue increased sharply as a result of the oil industry, drove this emigration. At the same time, on a domestic level, the Lebanese economy was greatly affected by the outbreak of the 1967 war with Israel, and its repercussions on the political stability in the country. As political divisions among the Lebanese people became more acute around political and economic reforms and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) usage of Lebanon as a military operations base against Israel, people increasingly felt the need to leave the country.

This trend is clearly reflected in the number of Lebanese people who arrived to (specifically) Australia during that period:

The years 1947-61 saw a net gain of about 400 Lebanese immigrants a year followed by a net intake of about 800 a year during 1961-6. However, following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and continuing conflict in Lebanon, the net intake jumped to 3,000 per year during 1966-71, which then declined a little to 2,200 a year during 1971-6.

As a result of this pattern of migration the number of Lebanese born in Australia grew relatively slowly from 1886 persons in 1947 to 10,668 by 1966. However, this number escalated to 24,218 in 1971 and as many as 33,424 in 1976 (Batrouney, in Hourani and Shehadi, Eds. 1992: 427-8).

³ The Ottoman 1914 census shows that the total population of the *Mutasarrifiya* was 540,000. Muslims constituted 17% of the population in Mount Lebanon. Of course, this figure was highly contested by the Maronites during the Paris Peace Conference that preceded the proclamation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. During this conference, the Maronites argued that the 1914 census intentionally undercounted the Christian population of the *Mutasarrifiya* (cited Winslow 1996, pp.61-62). Obviously, this number is much higher than the figure arrived at by Khater (2001).

⁴ In order to better appreciate the demographic impact of Lebanese emigration post-1920, I refer the reader to appendix 1.

The Lebanese Civil War: the fourth wave of emigration

During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989), it is estimated that 990,000 people left the country, accounting for 40% of the total population (Tabar, 2009b: 7). The fighting that ravaged Lebanon for fourteen years resulted in whole scale destruction of the economy and rendered large sectors of the economy inoperative.⁵ Hundreds of thousands of people were forced out of their homes, villages, and towns. Many civilians 'lost their resources and became homeless without income or health, social, housing and educational services' (Tabar, 2009b: 7) The rate of unemployment rose to 21% by the year 1985, and the minimum monthly salary declined 'from US\$280 at the end of 1983 to US\$27 in 1987' (Labaki, in Hourani and Shehadi, Eds. 1992: 606-607). In the 1980s, there were bouts of renewed fighting in which regional and domestic political forces were involved, including a large scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 followed by partial withdrawal in 1983, clashes between the Syrian army and Palestinian commandoes (1984-5), followed by Shi'i and Palestinian conflicts (1986), and inter- and intra- communal clashes (1986 and 1989). It is estimated that the fighting in 1989 'brought the rate of emigration back to its 1975 level' (Labaki, in Hourani and Shehadi, Eds. 1992: 609).⁶

As a result of the dramatic events occurring in Lebanon, Australia and Canada witnessed an unprecedented increase in the number of Lebanese immigrants. Between 1976 and 1981 more than 16,000 Lebanese came to Australia, which raised the number of Lebanese-born in Australia to 51,371. After ten years (1991) the number had increased to 68,995, with an almost equal number (67,453) of second generation Lebanese-Australians (Tabar, 2009). 'Of all immigrants of Lebanese origin living in Canada in 2001 [their number was 144,000], 37% had arrived here between 1991 and 2001, while another 36% had come to Canada in the 1980s. In contrast, 10% had come to Canada before 1971' (Lindsay, 2001: 9).

The events that occurred between 1975 and 1990 – the civil war, Arab-Israeli conflicts, Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, the war against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, inter- and intra- communal wars, and so on – created an internal displacement of people, a complete disruption of economic activities, and feelings of insecurity. As a result, a large number of people from all Lebanese communities coming from various economic backgrounds emigrated. This is reflected in the composition of immigrants who arrived in many countries including Australia, Canada, USA, France, Germany and the Gulf States.

Emigration post-1990

It is important to note that no official statistics on migration in Lebanon are available. More remarkable is the fact that no official census of the Lebanese population has been conducted since 1943, the year in which Lebanon gained political independence from France. Data on recent Lebanese migration has to be extrapolated from different sources, including, but not restricted to, individual studies and census data in the countries of destination.

⁵ For a good estimation of the social and economic cost of the war see, Labaki and Abu-Rjaili, (2005).

⁶ For approximate estimations of the number of Lebanese people who left Lebanon to different destinations between 1975-1977 and in 1975, 1979, and 1982, see appendix 2.

Since 1990, Lebanon has witnessed increased confrontations with Israel, culminating in the war of July 2006, in addition to experiencing a period of political instability punctuated by a number of political assassinations and civil strife.

It is apparent the economically hegemonic class in Lebanon, which is communally and traditionally fragmented, has refused to develop its agrarian and industrial sectors. Instead, it concentrated on the tertiary sector, placing emphasis on trading, tourism, banking and finance. This trend has been reinforced since 1990 as a result of the commitment of successive governments to neo-liberal economic policies, leading to a limited labor market characterized by low pay. In addition, Lebanon is politically structured around the interests of various religious groups. Frequent political crises tend to arise due to attempts by communal leaders to gain more control through rearranging the power structure. Furthermore, the geographic location of Lebanon, in a region riddled by political instability, has led it to become locked in an economic and political system that falls short of generating job opportunities and a decent standard of living for its citizens. Since 1967, Lebanon has not been able to put a stop to the rising numbers of emigrants seeking better futures for themselves and their families.

Migration in Lebanon has been, and still is, a major social, economic, and political phenomenon. However, it has a double effect: on the one hand, the emigration flow leads to a major loss in human capital, and, on the other, it has created a vast Lebanese diasporic community which provides a main source of foreign currency and makes a global network available to the local community, allowing Lebanese citizens to be particularly mobile in the global market.

Patterns and Characteristics of Migration Outflows

In Lebanon, a decision to emigrate is shaped by several factors, ranging from political and economic to social and familial. In this section, I aim to identify the key patterns of Lebanese emigration to shed light on the characteristics of the Lebanese diaspora and its links with the homeland.

Lebanese have emigrated under two sets of circumstances. The first is generally characterized by relative stability (1870-1914, 1945-1975, 1990-2007 and 2007-2009), and the second by conflict and strife (1958, 1973, 1975-1990, 2006 and 2007). Those who emigrated under the relatively stable circumstances were essentially driven by economic factors. Unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled laborers all left Lebanon as a result of limited job opportunities or as a result of limited income, which did not match the rising cost of living in the country.

One major development in Lebanese migration since the 1980s has been an increase in skilled migration. This has coincided with a change in demand from receiving countries for skilled labor, and the political instability that has been prevalent since the 1980s in Lebanon. Additionally, a drop in the value of the Lebanese Pound during the civil war rendered the majority of the Lebanese unable to secure middle class living standards and emigration was seen as an opportunity to seek a better fortune. Prior to the 1980s, it had predominantly been unskilled workers migrating to USA, Australia, and Canada as these countries faced a lack in the number of laborers.

In places where settlement and integration in the host countries were possible (Latin American countries, USA, Canada, Australia) a pattern of chain migration arose driven fundamentally by family ties.⁷ In other countries, where integration was extremely difficult (e.g. the Gulf and West African countries), Lebanese migrants made frequent return visits to Lebanon and generally refused to settle abroad permanently.

In the last twenty years or so, Lebanese emigrants to the Gulf States have increasingly come from a skilled and professional background (Tabar, 2009b: 12). This can be explained by pull factors resulting from the boom in the oil industry and recent efforts by Gulf governments to embark on large-scale infrastructural development and economic diversification projects. Furthermore, periods of civil strife in Lebanon have pushed professionals not only towards the Gulf, also to Europe and countries in the West such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. Lebanese migration to Europe was mainly concentrated in France before the 1975 Civil War and to France, Germany, Great Britain, and Eastern Europe after 1975 (Tabar, 2009b: 12). According to Harfoush (1974), in 1970 there were 4,200 Lebanese migrants living in Europe, and 2,500 of these were residing in France. Before 1975, most were professionals and business people, yet post-1975 – after the outbreak of the civil war – migrants came from a socially mixed background.

Some Lebanese migrated to developing countries,⁸ particularly in Africa, driven by prospects of engaging in commercial activities, including the black market, which led to huge amounts of money in a short period of time.

During times of conflict and civil strife, an increase in the number of migrants was witnessed. These waves of migration were characterized by a variety of social and economic backgrounds and links abroad. More Lebanese migrated to European and Gulf countries compared to the periods that preceded the outbreak of the 1975 civil war. This particular type of Lebanese migration led to a considerable drop in the number of Lebanese migrants bound for Latin American countries (when compared to the number of people who left to these destinations during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century), and a considerable increase in the number of people who targeted the USA, Canada, and Australia. Many people were admitted on humanitarian grounds to countries such as Australia, Canada, and European countries, both when the civil strife intensified and when the Israeli aggression on Lebanon deepened between 1977-1978, in 1982, and in July 2007 (Labaki, 2005).

There are few figures by which to determine the size of return migration to Lebanon. This is particularly true regarding the number of Lebanese who chose to leave during periods of intense hostilities and returned afterward. However, evidence from several newspaper reports indicates that only a small proportion of those who emigrated eventually decided to return to Lebanon. The instability in Lebanon after the outbreak of civil war in 1975 resulted in a substantial increase in Lebanese leaving. Traditionally, Christians – and to a lesser degree, Druze – from rural areas comprised the vast majority of migrants, but with the outbreak of the civil war, the demographic of Lebanese migrants changed significantly. More urban dwellers were forced to leave, and more Muslims (Sunni and Shiite) departed the

⁷ The total number of Lebanese who emigrated to USA, Canada, Australia and Europe, (France, Germany and Great Britain) excluding visitors-tourists and businessmen between 1991-2000 is 53725, 44153, 13937 and 58103 respectively (Information International, 2001)

⁸ Note the early Lebanese migration to Mexico and Latin American countries, mainly Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil.

West, pressured by the fact that cities constituted the battlegrounds, and south Lebanon, predominantly rural and inhabited by Shiites, was regularly attacked and periodically occupied by the Israeli army. Due to the intensified escalation of violence the opportunity arose and western countries became more flexible in their immigration policies, becoming less discriminatory and accepted people to immigrate regardless of their religious backgrounds: these developments led Shiite and Sunni Lebanese (residing mainly in Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida) to diversify their countries of destination resulting in an extraordinary increase in those leaving to Western countries such as Australia, Canada, the USA and many countries in Europe.⁹ As a result, the impact of emigration on Lebanese human development has become more widespread on both a geographic and a religious level. New mansions, roofed with red tiles, are found not only in predominantly Christian villages located in Mount Lebanon as a result, but also in almost all rural villages in Lebanon.

To sum up, we note the following trends regarding Lebanese migration:

- *Early Lebanese migration*
Primarily to the USA, Mexico, and Latin American countries, this was economic migration leading to permanent settlement and integration, practiced by semi-skilled and unskilled migrants, that was also driven by the prospects of commercial activity.
- *Post-WWII migration*
This followed the same pattern of migration, but included a broadening in the range of destination countries, adding Australia, New Zealand, France, West African countries and the Gulf States.
- *Post-civil war migration*
A substantial number of skilled migrants left during this period, particularly professionals emigrating to the West and the Gulf States. This migration is characterized by family ties and permanent settlement in host countries.

During periods of intense conflict, emigration from Lebanon was characterized by:

- A sharp increase to all countries previously mentioned, except for countries in West Africa and Latin America.
- Emigrants drawn from all social categories (different religious and age groups, lower and middle classes).
- A large number of people given the right to emigrate based on humanitarian grounds. During this period, more people were also granted visas to Western countries as refugees and political asylum seekers (Tabar, 2009b: 14).
- A sharp increase in people emigrating to Western (France, Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Denmark and Sweden) and Eastern European (Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Moldova, Lithuania, etc.) countries, particularly of professionals and business people (Tabar, 2009b: 15). In contrast, France traditionally attracted students of a higher socio-economic background and Lebanese Christians, who culturally identified with

⁹In its recent report, Information International (2001) shows the geographical and confessional diversification of the Lebanese who left the country between 1991 and 2000 seeking work abroad: "South Lebanon (including Nabatieh) constitutes the largest source of those working abroad (39.2%), followed by Mount Lebanon (27.5%), the Bekaa Valley (12.8%), North Lebanon (11.1%) and Beirut (9.4%)" (Information International, 2001).

France more than any other country due to its decisive role in the formation of Grand Liban.¹⁰

Patterns and Characteristics of Migration Inflows

Since its inception Lebanon has been a sending country as a result of perennial political instability and lopsided economic development. However, since the 1990 end of the Lebanese civil war, it has increasingly become a country with a “special migration pattern” (ESCWA, 2007). It has emerged as a ‘receiving’ country, accepting significant flows of both Arab and non-Arab migration. Migrants and refugees from countries such as Iraq, Syria, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Ethiopia have come to Lebanon in substantial numbers, causing what the Lebanese government usually considers a ‘burden’ on the labor market. Armenian and Palestinian refugees, as well as migrants from a variety of ethnic minorities in neighboring Syria and Iraq, came to Lebanon a long time before 1990, and have settled in the country ever since.

Lebanon, as a diverse sending country, underwent a progressive switch after the civil war, whereby substantial brain drain occurred and replacement migration resulted in flows of migrants from neighboring and Asian countries to arrive in Lebanon. This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘replacement migration paradigm’, moving from emigration to a large influx of migrants after the civil war.

As a result of the war, Lebanon witnessed considerable voluntary and compulsory displacement of its citizens. Although there are no official figures available, it is generally accepted that the Lebanese Diaspora is quite vast, including hundreds of thousands of Lebanese – some in temporary exile, others seeking jobs and becoming permanent emigrants. After the civil war, when the violence calmed, Lebanon offered a number of job opportunities that many Lebanese in exile were wary to return for, questioning the safety of repatriation. Most of these jobs involved manual labor, which many Lebanese were not attracted to. Additionally, success abroad pushed many even further from Lebanon. Consequently, the departure of many Lebanese – not only the educated – during the civil war led to an influx of foreign migrant workers who were willing to take the chance to come to Lebanon and earn a living (Sussman, 2009).

Characteristics and patterns of migration and asylum in Lebanon

Lebanon is a multi-confessional republic with around 4 million inhabitants. It is characterized by a sectarian power-sharing structure that arose as a result of its history, which is filled with sectarian and communal power struggles. Consequently, Lebanon has struggled for years on end to deal with human loss and brain drain as a consequence of continual emigration, in addition to an influx of refugees and asylum seekers resulting from Lebanon’s location in a region riddled with conflict and war.

Power distribution in Lebanon is a domestic concern. One of the main concerns of the Lebanese government is to resolve any issue that threatens the power structure – including

¹⁰ Labiki (2005) gives an idea about the immigration of Lebanese to France and Greece between April 1975 and April 1977. He indicates that the numbers are 21,126 and 15,002 respectively. He also adds that the total number who left to European countries between 1975 and 1980 was 10,000.

that of refugees and migrants. One of the largest threats to the demographic structure that gives Christians and Muslims equal representation in the parliament is that of the Palestinians in Lebanon, who have been residing in camps since the *Nakba* in 1948. These Palestinians are predominantly Sunni Muslims – and, if naturalized, they could destroy the sectarian make-up of the country. As a result, immigration policies that are designed for Palestinians but applied to all migrants frustrate the entire system. These regulations are strict and tied to domestic, regional, and international constraints.

According to Hanafi et al., (2008) an excess of almost 400,000 Palestinian refugees are currently registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East in Lebanon. However, only about 200,000-250,000 refugees actually currently reside in Lebanon (Pedersen, 2003, cited by Hanafi et al., 2008). Up to two-thirds of Palestinians living in Lebanon reside in the UNRWA-served refugee camps, or in small communities close to these camps where they may access the services of UNRWA and other NGOs. The rest of the Palestinians reside throughout Lebanon. Additionally, approximately 150,000 Palestinians continue to live in Europe (Hanafi et al., 2008).

The Middle East has hosted considerable numbers of Palestinian refugees since the Nakba of 1948. But the Palestinian refugee issue in Lebanon is quite different from that in other Arab nations as a result of many significant historical events (Hanafi et al., 2008). Lebanon has increasingly become considered an archetypical example of a country that holds reservations about hosting migrants and refugees. As a result, the Lebanese legal framework supports the exclusion of these migrant groups from all domains of life – most importantly, the labor force – making Lebanon a country that is not particularly favored by refugees.

If we take the case of Iraqi refugees, we find that in comparison to Syria and Jordan, the number of refugees in Lebanon is small - around 50,000 (IRIN, 2010). The UNHCR has estimated that there are around 2.2 million Iraqi refugees in the Middle East (Couldrey & Morris, 2010).

Nevertheless, the presence of Iraqis in Lebanon is particularly important, as Lebanon is relatively smaller in size than Syria and Jordan and already carries what it considers to be a significant refugee 'burden': the Palestinians (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 1). As of June 18, 2008, UNHCR had recognized 10,682 Iraqi refugees and 584 Iraqi asylum seekers, leaving a little less than 40,000 Iraqi refugees without any sort of legal status (Hilal & Samy, 2008: 17). It is critical to note that only UNHCR recognized these refugees, not the Lebanese authorities, as they do not accept UNHCR's determinations regarding Iraqi refugees.

The manner in which the Lebanese authorities handle Iraqi refugees is strongly linked to the attitudes authorities hold towards Palestinians, particularly insofar as Lebanon rejects 'country of settlement' status. In addition, Lebanon's situation as a country whose political system is based on equal religious representation makes the issue of migrants one that is connected to national, regional, and international politics and policy-making. It is not remarkable, then, that as a result the extremely uncertain and unsafe status of Iraqis in Lebanon is typical of the many ways in which Palestinian refugees are treated in Lebanon.

Syrian migrant workers in Lebanon have historically faced a long pattern of migration, hard labor, and return (Chalcraft, 2009: 221). After WWII, and between the years of 1940 and 1950, as Lebanon and Syria emerged as separate nation-states, an interesting migration trend was created: Lebanon began receiving Syrian migrant labor, establishing a new pattern of 'South-South' regional labor migration. This continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and

became a mass phenomenon (Chalcraft, 2009: 89). The migrant inflow was particularly formed by ease in transport, short geographic distance, social networking, and the relatively open border between the two countries. It was driven by new Syrian aspirations to make money and create better opportunities for themselves.

During the Lebanese Civil War, and particularly during the Syrian army invasion, Syrian migrant workers were greatly discriminated against, and, as a result, this hard-working group of people saw the need to return to Syria after what had been a long period of acceptance in Lebanon. However, since the end of the war in the 1990s, and the signing of the Ta'if Agreement, Syrians have returned to Lebanon in large numbers to work all around the nation. Contrary to the mass influx of Iraqi and Palestinians refugees, Syrian immigration was characterized by individualism. Chalcraft describes this flow as a “prolonged pattern of circular migration involving mostly male, menial labor” (2009: 17).

Furthermore, there are large numbers of migrant workers from Asia and Africa employed as domestic workers in Lebanon. Human Rights Watch estimates the number to be around 200,000, primarily from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia. These domestic workers play an important role in Lebanese households.¹¹ Prior to the Lebanese Civil War, most Lebanese households preferred to employ Syrian or Lebanese women. However, as the war progressed, and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese fled civil strife, many Asian and African migrants came in to fill the jobs of those who had left. Since then, the influx of foreign women has increased drastically as demand has increased for three reasons: they will work for wages lower than the minimum wage, they are not registered with social security or covered by health insurance, and they are easily exploitable in the sense that they are extremely compliant (Jureidini, 2002: 2).

Aspects of law, policy and governance that pertain to migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees

International legal obligations and periodic reports pertaining to migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Lebanon

Lebanon does not recognize refugees other than the Palestinians. As a result, non-Palestinians deemed by the UNHCR to be refugees are considered illegal migrants by the Lebanese government. The right to political asylum does not exist in Lebanon's constitution. This is contradictory to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that, “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”.¹² Lebanon has long been proud of the role it played in establishing the Declaration, but has excluded the right to asylum protection.

Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (the ‘Geneva Convention’) or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). Furthermore,

¹¹ Human Rights Watch. 2008. “Lebanon Protect Domestic Workers from Abuse, Exploitation,” April 29, 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/29/lebanon-protect-domestic-workers-abuse-exploitation>. Accessed, February 7, 2011.

¹² United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

Lebanon's constitution does not include any legal provisions that clarify the status of refugees and asylum seekers (Hilal & Samy, 2008: 3). As a result, Lebanon stresses that it is a transit country for migrants – a layover until refugees may be resettled elsewhere. Dorai et al. reiterate this, claiming that, "Lebanon cannot be considered as an asylum country, but only as a transit country" (2006: 5). A Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Lebanese General Security and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2003 also supports this statement. Since Lebanon has not ratified the CMW, it does not report to any international body about its treatment of migrant workers (Hilal & Samy, 2008). Lebanon's collaboration with the UNHCR and the UNRWA is not substantive. It is not clear as to why Lebanon has not ratified the CMW. Refusal to ratify the Geneva Convention, however, may be a result of the unresolved issue of a long-term solution for Palestinian refugees.

Lebanon is also a signatory to the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This convention clarifies that "no State Party shall expel, turn back or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" (United Nations Convention Against Torture, Part I Article 3). Therefore, Lebanese authorities should not reject asylum seekers – unfortunately, however, this is not the case.

National Legislation

The law regulating refugees in Lebanon is *The Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country (Law of Entry and Exit)*, which came into force on July 10, 1962. This law stipulates that any individual that feels his life or liberty is threatened in any country is able to ask for political asylum in Lebanon and will not be deported to his respective nation (Hilal & Samy, 2008). This principle is underscored in law number 185 of May 24, 2000, having to do with non-Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Dorai et al., 2006). However, this does not stop Lebanese authorities from deporting refugees, regardless of the law. Through pressure, General Security in Lebanon tends to deport many non-Palestinian refugees. Thus, there is a clear absence of legal status for asylum seekers and refugees in Lebanon – in particular, those who are non-Palestinian.

Article 32 of Lebanon's Law of Entry and Exit states that a foreigner who enters Lebanon illegally is liable to serve a prison sentence between one month and three years, pay a fine, and face deportation. Illegal aliens who are detained by Lebanese General Security are usually sentenced to one month in prison, fined, and ultimately face deportation (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 2). Unfortunately, this is what most non-Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face. Once they have completed their prison sentence, the Directorate General of General Security assumes responsibility for the refugees, and, in line with international law, does not subject them to *refoulement*. Thus, the Iraqi (and other non-Palestinian) refugees are held in Lebanese prisons indefinitely (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 2). There is only one way in which a detained Iraqi may leave prison: by obtaining a work permit, with or without help from UNHCR. This is extremely difficult to do, and therefore the majority of Iraqis detained in Lebanon are released only upon agreeing to return to Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 3).

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are treated differently than other foreigners, as they are subject to special laws. Almost all Palestinians in Lebanon, with the exception of a few

thousand who are not registered with UNRWA or the Lebanese Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs, hold residency cards and are allowed to exit and enter Lebanon as they please. However, there are many laws that exclude them from socio-political activity in Lebanon, particularly those laws that limit participation in the labor market.

Governance and policy developments affecting migrants, asylum seekers and refugees

In September 2003, the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR, aimed at shedding light on the role of UNHCR in Lebanon. In the memorandum, Lebanon emphasizes that it is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention or the 1967 Protocol, and therefore is not required to abide by the protection regulations they establish. The MOU explains that this is as a result of the “burden” the Palestinian issue placed on Lebanon’s resources (Dorai et al., 2006).

Under the MOU, asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR are issued a circulation permit valid for three months. If an individual is recognized to be a refugee by UNHCR, Lebanese General Security will renew the permit for six more months. However, during this time, UNHCR is responsible for seeking resettlement opportunities for the individual in a country other than Lebanon. It is important to highlight that the MOU does not place Lebanon in any position to provide refugees with access to the basic human rights of education, healthcare, and employment.

In June 2005, the Lebanese Ministry of Labor amended Decision No. 621/1 “Concerning Businesses and Professions Restricted to Lebanese, 15 December 1995”. According to the amendment, a ban on Palestinian employment in more than 50 occupations was lifted.¹³ Albeit long overdue, the decision was considered a welcome move by the Lebanese Government towards Palestinians in Lebanon, enhancing their socio-economic status.

The economic and livelihood consequences of migration

Migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and the labor market in Lebanon

There are no specific laws relating to the protection of migrant workers’ rights in Lebanon. There are, however, certain provisions in the constitution and some labor laws that apply, in principle, to migrants. The Labor Code of 1946, the primary Lebanese labor law, includes non-Lebanese. However, Article 7 of the Code excludes domestic workers, thereby denying protection and benefits to migrant workers that are otherwise offered to Lebanese nationals. In order for migrant workers to enter the Lebanese labor market, they must first secure a work permit from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Presidential Decree 17561, of 18 September 1964, specifies that non-Lebanese seeking work must obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Labor before traveling to Lebanon (Amnesty International, 2007).

Securing a work permit in Lebanon is expensive and time-consuming. As a result, most employers reject the process of obtaining a work permit, and hire foreign migrant workers through the sponsorship system, otherwise known as *kaafala*. *Kafala* structures how a Lebanese employer may ‘sponsor’ a migrant worker for the duration of a contract

¹³ Amnesty International. 2007. “Palestinian Refugees Suffer in Lebanon,” 16 October 2007. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/palestinian-refugees-suffer-lebanon-20071017>. Accessed February 7, 2011.

(Philippines Today, 2006).¹⁴ The system insists that a one-time, US \$1,000 bond must be paid to the Central Housing Loan Bank for each foreign employee, as a “registration of sponsorship” (Philippines Today, 2006).

The types of jobs that these migrants usually undertake are those jobs that tend to be tough, that retain a certain amount of hazard, and that can be considered dirty (Shahnawaz, 2002). Lebanese nationals are less likely to be hired in the positions as they are less willing to suffer the indignities of a socially stigmatized, underpaid, and degrading job (Shahnawaz, 2002). In fact, these migrants are usually hired in “specific economic niches” (such as construction and sanitation), which most Lebanese do not tend to seek employment (Dorai et al., 2006: 13; Chalcraft, 2009) and therefore do not pose a direct threat to the Lebanese economy or the Lebanese workforce.

The ILO Regional Office for the Arab States, the Migrants Center of Caritas Lebanon, and the International Organization for Migration have been working hard to advocate for the right of migrants and refugees to enter the labor market in Lebanon and be treated equally to Lebanese citizens. It is quite unfortunate that the Lebanese authorities have shown little sign of changing current policies and laws.

The macro-economic impact of remittances

As more of the world’s citizens choose to become migrants, the international economy becomes increasingly affected. The greater share of this effect comes from remittances, the portion of migrant income that is sent back to the country of origin to support families and friends on the micro level, and the country as a whole on the macro level. Remittances can be loosely defined as monetary flows that include a portion of the migrant income earned in the host country that is sent back to the country of origin in either the tangible form of money or through goods (Hertlein and Vadean, 2006). In migration literature, the term “remittances” generally refers to monetary transfers in cash or goods. However, both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have defined the term “remittances” more broadly. The IMF has stated that remittances include three categories of data, the sum of the three comprising the “total remittances” that could be transferred to the country of origin. The first concerns workers’ remittances: transfers in cash or goods from migrants to friends and family in the country of origin, usually occurring often, and based on a kinship network, where the migrant spends over a year abroad (Kapur, 2004). The second consists of compensation to employees: the salaries and wages of individuals living abroad, often seasonal or short-term workers, as well as those working in diplomatic, foreign, and international missions. The third includes migrants’ transfers: capital transfers of financial assets by migrants as they move from one country to another, usually for more than one year. The UN has defined remittances in a more formally, claiming that they consist of any “financial resource flows arising from the cross-border movement of nationals of a country” (Kapur, 2004: 1).

Remittances have been shown to be the most stable source of financial inflow for some countries, especially those undergoing times of crisis or “shocks” (Kapur, 2004). Remittances

¹⁴ De laPaz, Isagani, “Stranded Pinoys in Lebanon Still Traded, NGO Says,” 12 September 2006, <http://www.philippinestoday.net/index.php?module=article&view=119>, Accessed February 7, 2011.

have proven to be a survival line for countries undergoing times of cyclical violence, war or instability. In this case, money received is used as a “critical insurance mechanism” (Kapur, 2004: 7) especially in countries affected by political crises, such as Lebanon.

To sum up, remittances are a significant stable source of external development finance for many developing countries, provide critical injections of cash into local economies, and have not only become a major source of external financing, but have also have played an effective role in poverty reduction and contribute considerably to the global economy.

Remittances have been shown to significantly reduce both the level and severity of poverty in developing countries. Studies demonstrate that a 10% increase in the amount of remittances per capita leads to a 3.5% decline in the number of people living in poverty in a developing country, a substantial figure for poverty-stricken nations. In addition, results suggest that a 10% increase in migrants within a developing country’s population leads to a 2.1% decline in the amount of people living on less than US \$1 per day, providing they all remit.¹⁵ Therefore, both migration and remittances considerably reduce poverty in the developing world, positively impacting the economy (Chami et al., 2005).

Remittances have proven to be a viable source of income for developing countries with failed development plans. Development requires considerable high-cost planning, which most developing countries in the world do not have the capacity to commit to. Remittances, then, make up a crucial part of both household incomes and the national economy.

The socio-economic impact of remittances in Lebanon

The Lebanese diaspora plays a large role in influencing economic growth and development in Lebanon. Not only do remittances significantly enhance the economic status of many Lebanese who have family members in the diaspora, but they also play a key role in promoting and maintaining stability in the Lebanese economy.

Remittances are often considered the second largest source of external funding for developing countries worldwide, after FDI. In Lebanon, the two are reversed. Remittances are the top source of foreign exchange earnings in Lebanon. According to the World Bank, Lebanon’s remittances have been increasing yearly. Lebanon’s estimated remittance flow in 2008 reached US \$6 billion, an increase of four percent since 2007 (Project Middle East, 2010).¹⁶ Lebanon ranked 18th on the list of countries with the largest amounts of remittances received in 2008, immediately behind Indonesia, Morocco, and Pakistan.¹⁷ The World Bank estimated remittances to Lebanon in 2007 were equal to 24.4 percent of the GDP in 2007, the fifth highest such ratio in the world behind Honduras, Lesotho, Moldova, and Tajikistan, and the highest in the MENA region.¹⁸ This financial contribution is vital in maintaining the economic stability of the country, especially during times of war, civil strife, and political insecurity.

Remittances are a key source of foreign exchange earnings in Lebanon (Ghobril, 2004). Between 1998 and 2001, FDI in Lebanon, which should be the main pathway of foreign

¹⁵ Boboc, C. Jennequin, H. Lavigne, A. Rabaud, I. and Unan, E. (2007) Migration as a Win-Win Process in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Remittances, and Intergenerational Transfers between Countries with Different Demographic Cycles. Go-Euro Med Working Paper 0714, 31/12/2007

financing of the nation, reached US \$250 million. Remittances, however, reached US \$1.6 billion dollars, ahead of exports and tourism, which averaged US \$740 and US \$840 million, respectively (Project Middle East, 2010).

Unfortunately, there have been no successful attempts at managing or maintaining these monetary flows. It is critical that Lebanon and other developing nations develop such regulations to prevent the manipulation and loss of remittances.

Even though remittance flows serve a developing country, they are rarely intended to serve as “capital for economic development, but as compensation” for poor economic situations (Chami et al., 2005: 77). FDI is constantly positively correlated with GDP growth. Remittances are often correlated with negative GDP growth, and remittance flows are then used to compensate this negative growth (Kapur, 2004: 10). Remittances are apparently not intended as capital flows, but still serve developing countries positively.

Remittances could cause large inequalities in both class structure and the constitution of societies, causing widespread confusion in analyzing the poverty rate. Individuals with migrant relatives could easily change their spending habits, moving from low-income to a middle-income status. This income distribution may provide a sense of unfairness to other families, giving rise to more migration. The danger of dependency on remittances comes into play here. If a family becomes dependent on a large flow of remittances, it is quite possible that the low-paying jobs offered in the country of origin would not appeal to citizens anymore, causing chaos in the labor market of the internal economy (Hertlein and Vadean, 2006). This partly explains why many Lebanese abstain from performing menial jobs, and Arab and Asian migrant workers are predominantly found in this sector of the economy.

Furthermore, remittances are critical to developing societies since they are used as “social insurance” (Kapur, 2004). Remittances not only provide income to families, but also for education, health care, and investment. Often migrants send money to children back home in order to provide for a proper future. Studies have shown that remittances have allowed improvements in the educational level of younger generations (Hertlein and Vadean, 2006). In addition, improvements remittances make in health care are far more than just tangible. In addition to increased financial support for health care, individuals receiving remittances often receive health care advice due to the awareness and knowledge that migrants gain from living abroad. It is difficult, however, to measure exactly how much remittance money is used for health care.

There are many reasons that account for the large flow of remittances to Lebanon. One major reason is the liberality of Lebanon’s economic and financial systems. A second significant reason is the stable exchange rate, which, although being costly has proved to be a key issue in drawing this great stream of remittances into the country (Ghobril, 2004). Moreover, Lebanon's developed banking system and high interest rate differentials also encourage emigrants to send their money to Lebanon.

Remittances are transferred through both formal and informal channels. However, the past few years have seen a vast increase in the number of remittances arriving in Lebanon through the informal cash carry and *hawala* systems. This has sparked a controversial debate about the influence of remittances in Lebanon. It is widely held that Lebanon is greatly dependent on remittances, but it is actually believed these actually contribute negatively to the economy. These researchers claim that the actual benefit of remittances is questionable, since most goes towards household consumption rather than solid investment. This is

confirmed in a recent study shows that remittances make up a large percentage of household savings, a massive 88 percent, and almost 22 percent of household income (Ghobril, 2004). The majority are used on a personal level - for goods, education, health care – a significantly smaller part is set aside for investments, and an even smaller part for savings, bonds, and job creation. Nevertheless, remittances have a considerable impact on the Lebanese economy: household consumption is shown to raise the income of Lebanese households, in turn leading to a greater demand in the economy and an increase in job creation (Ghobril, 2004). Furthermore, Lebanon has witnessed an increase in transnational philanthropy, a process through which migrants assign a part of their remittances to support and finance growth and societal advancement in their country of origin that is not surprising given the strong links with the diaspora. Through this process, Lebanese migrants make philanthropic contributions through formal structures such as religious, district, or village organizations, and through informal structures which include kinship ties, friendships, and the like.¹⁹ This is particularly evident during times of war, when members of the Lebanese diaspora exert huge efforts into increasing the amount of remittances their friends and family receive.

During the July 2006 war, remittances increased as emigrants feared for the safety and security of family and friends back home. According to a study conducted on migrant families abroad, 17 percent of the migrant diaspora claimed they notably increased their remittances to family and friends in Lebanon. Furthermore, slightly more than one-third of Lebanese residing in Lebanon (34.9 percent) claimed that they noticed an increase in the amount of remittances that they had ordinarily received (Hourani & Dabbous, 2007: 47). The diaspora demonstrated that its involvement was crucial and needed during July 2006, especially since international aid took quite some time to arrive to Lebanon.

Furthermore, a careful examination of immigration in Lebanon shows the indelible effects of return migration on the formation of the middle and upper classes in Lebanon.²⁰ Analysis that does not take this factor on board will always be less than complete. Take, for example, the case of the *Shi`a* community in Lebanon. The class transformation of this community over the last 60 years, from a predominantly agrarian community to a community immersed in capitalist economic activities, cannot be understood if the impact of Shiite migration is not considered. The direct impact on human development is also manifested in the process of political elite formation in Lebanon. Traditional leaders are strongly supported, and new political leaders are created, with decisive or partial help from the impact of migration. It is common knowledge in Lebanon that the political campaigns of the traditional family leadership of Frangieh and Junblat, for instance, are funded, to a large degree, by wealthy Lebanese migrants. Recently, important Lebanese political leaders have been able to join the political elite after the Ta'if Accord (1989) due to the great wealth they have accumulated abroad.²¹

It is estimated that a huge amount of money (there are no official figures) is sent every year to welfare, charitable, and philanthropic institutions. This money is most certainly consolidating the ability of civil society to endure the lack of proper social and welfare services in Lebanon. Diasporic money is currently being channeled into building schools, colleges, hospitals, clinics, roads, religious buildings such as churches and mosques, and

¹⁹ For more on transnational philanthropy, see: Hanafi (2000).

²⁰ For information on the bourgeoisification of Christians and the Shiites, see: Khater (2001), and Nasr (1984).

²¹ For example, the late Rafiq Hariri, his heir Saad Hariri, ex-prime minister Najib Meqati, current cabinet member Mohammad Safadi, and ex-cabinet member Issam Faris. For more details see: Tabar (2002).

community halls (Tabar, 2009b: 21). The Lebanese diaspora of Muslim (Sunni and Shiite) background are increasingly sending donations to their religious authorities in fulfillment of one of their basic religious duty, the payment of the *zakaat* (alms-giving). This ranges from 1/10 to 1/5 of one's yearly income (Tabar, 2009b: 21). This is a clear outcome of increasing religiosity and the rise of political Islam among diasporic Muslim communities (Tabar, 2009b: 21). In addition, large amounts of money are donated by individual migrants towards particular projects in his/her village/town of origin: often these donations can amount to tens of thousands of US dollars (Tabar, 2009b: 21).

Conclusion

There are three significant characteristics that make Lebanese migration peculiar and a case worth noting. First, the long history of Lebanese migration falls in parallel with the modern history of Lebanon as a nation, and as a capitalist economy. As shown above, a substantial number of Lebanese have made the world their home, dating back to the time when the Lebanese state and economy were being constructed. Lebanese migrants played a major role in the construction of the state and nation building in Lebanon. They had, and still have a significant impact on the development of Lebanon's economy (mainly due to remittances) and have taken an important role in class formation and mobility. Second, the number of emigrants and their descendants is more than double that of Lebanese residing in Lebanon. Third, and finally, there is a nearly global distribution of the Lebanese diaspora, with significant presence in advanced capitalist countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, France, Germany and Britain.

These factors enable both Lebanese in Lebanon and abroad to benefit from the economic, social, and cultural opportunities offered to them (without discounting the impact of economic crises and racism on reducing these opportunities in some instances). In addition, migration has provided the Lebanese with a resourceful network of support that covers most of the globe, and can be mobilized in times of need, as history has shown.

Annex: Lebanese Population by Religion: 1922-1975 (Faour, 1991: 632)

Total*	Muslims	Christians	Source	Method of Computation	Year
609,070	273,366	335,668	Himadeh, 1936: 408-409	census	1922
785,543	383,180	392,544	Himadeh, 1936:408-409	census	1932
1,046,421	495,003	544,822	Hourani, 1946, cited in Chamie, 1977:14	official estimate	1943
1,303,940	571,109	700,154	Tabbarah, 1954, cited in Chamie, 1980:177	estimate	1951
1,411,000	624,000	787,000	Hudson, 1968:22; Soffer, 1986:22	estimate	1956
1,626,000	-	-	IRFED Mission, cited in Chamie, 1977:14	estimate	1959
2,151,884	-	-	Ministry of Interior, cited in Chamie, 1977:14	estimate	1961
2,179,700	-	-	Ministry of Planning, cited in Courbages & Fargues, 1974:24	survey	1964
2,126,000	-	-	Ministry of Planning, cited in UN-ECWA, 1980:4	survey	1970
2,265,000	-	-	Courbages & Fargues, 1974:24	adjusted survey total	1970
2,550,000	-	-	UN-ECWA, 1980:4	estimate	1975

*Total population includes members of the small religious groups such as Jews and Bahais.

Table 2: Lebanese emigration between April 1975 and April 1977 (Labaki et al., 2005: 62)

Country	Number of Citizens Who Left Lebanon	Number of Citizens Who Returned to Lebanon	Total Number of Emigrants
Syria	193,588	120,338	73,250
Arab Gulf States	97,890	56,943	40,947
Africa	86,150	54,830	31,320

France	48,977	27,851	21,126
Greece	36,975	21,973	15,002
Great Britain	34,934	19,305	15,629
Australia	26,544	5,847	20,697
United States of America	17,860	3,345	14,515
Other Countries	82,842	42,828	40,014
Total Amount	625,760	353,260	272,500

Table 3: The number of the Lebanese emigrant workforce by country during the years 1975, 1979, and 1982 (Labaki et al., 2005: 68)

Country	1975		1979		1982	
	Amount in Thousands	%	Amount in Thousands	%	Amount in Thousands	%
<i>Arab World</i>	51.1	52.1	123.8	58.8	148.5	59.7
Saudi Arabia	20.0	20.4	73.4	34.7	82.6	33.5
Libya	5.7	5.8	8.5	4.1	8.0	3.2
United Arab Emirates	4.5	4.6	9.7	4.6	12.8	5.1
Kuwait	7.3	7.4	15.8	7.5	20.6	8.3
Qatar	1.5	1.5	3.3	1.6	4.5	1.8
Bahrain	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.5	3.2	1.2
Jordan	7.5	7.7	6.9	3.2	8.8	3.5
Oman	1.1	1.1	2.2	1.1	3.2	1.2
Iraq	3.0	3.1	3.0	1.5	4.8	1.9
<i>Other Countries</i>	46.9	47.9	86.9	41.2	97.7	39.3
West Africa	9.4	9.6	17.3	8.1	18.2	7.3
Europe	18.0	18.4	27.0	12.9	30.2	12.2
North America	5.0	5.1	11.6	5.5	13.7	5.5
South America	8.5	8.7	17.0	8.1	18.2	7.3
Australia	6.0	6.1	14.0	6.6	17.4	7.0

Total Number	98.0	100.0	210.7	100.0	246.2	100.0 (Correct number is 99.0) because the number 100.00 has been rounded.
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Table 4: Emigration from North Lebanon during the first three years of the Lebanese Civil War according by category (Labaki et al., 2005: 76)

Category	Total Number of Emigrants
Skilled Workers and Artisans	22,000
Unskilled Workers	16,000
Trading and Trades-people	6,000
Students	8,000
Others	8,000
Total Number	60,000

Table 5: The total number of Lebanese emigrants compared to the total amount of the Lebanese emigrant workforce to the Arab World from 1975 to 1985 (Labaki et al., 2005: 79)

Year	1975	1980	1985
Total Number of Lebanese Emigrants	115,726	168,000	286,000
Total Number of Lebanese Emigrant Workforce	50,000	-	73,000

Table 6: Remittances to Lebanon and the GNP from 1970 to 1988 (Labaki and Abu Rjaili, 2005: 87)

Year	Remittances (in USD Millions)	GNP (in USD Millions)	Percentage of Remittances in GNP
1970	251	1,330	18.8
1971	272	1,440	18.8
1972	307	1,490	20.6
1973	361	1,670	21.6
1974	912	3,492	26.1
1975	515	3,567	14.4
1976	27	2,089	1.2
1977	1,114	3,300	33.0
1978	685	3,830	17.8
1979	1,772	4,472	39.6
1980	2,252	4,912	45.8
1981	1,920	4,528	42.4
1982	1,200	4,250	28.2
1983	900	4,570	19.6
1984	700	4,860	14.4
1985	400	2,940	13.6
1986	850	250	32.1
1987	2,130	3,296	64.6
1988	600	3,883	15.4

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